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R E S I D E N T I A L  T E R R I T O R I E S  
CUES TO BURGLARY VULNERABILITY
BARBARA B. BROWN
□  Newman’s work on defensible space and Altman’s work on territoriality were 
used to formulate a hypothesis that certain design elements enhance or reflect 
residential territoriality and thereby influence burglars’ target selections. Spe­
cifically, evidence on the links from real and symbolic barriers, traces, and 
detectability features to burglary vulnerability and residential territoriality are 
reviewed. □
In 1981, 7,394,000 households in the United States were burglarized at a rate of 7 
burglaries per 100 households (U.S. Department of Justice, 1983). For over 20 years 
researchers have examined the links among environmental design and human behavior 
to explain why criminals choose particular targets. The present paper draws from work 
on defensible space and territoriality to describe a model of burglary vulnerability based 
upon four broad classes of environmental features: symbolic barriers, actual barriers, 
traces, and detectability. Current research that supports the model’s four categories of 
burglary vulnerability is described with particular emphasis given to the author’s appli­
cation of the model to a study of suburban burglary.
NEWMAN AND DEFENSIBLE SPACE
The first major link from environmental and social characteristics to crime rates was 
forged by Oscar Newman, an architect. His observations of crime rates in two federally 
funded housing projects led him to promote designs that enhance the “defensible space” 
of the residents. According to Newman (1972):
Defensible space . . . inhibits crime by creating the physical expression of a social fabric that 
defends itself. The potential criminal perceives such a space as controlled by its residents, 
leaving him an intruder easily dealt with. (p. 13)
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Newman described design features that would elicit a “latent territoriality and sense 
of community” (p. 3) from residents. In particular, Newman favored designs that allowed 
for informal surveillance and the creation of residential zones of influence perceived by 
neighbors and potential criminals alike. Informal surveillance potential can be enhanced 
by proper placement of windows, walls, and landscaping to provide the residents with 
clear views of neighborhood areas such as playgrounds, parking lots, pathways, entry- I 
ways, and lobbies. Zones of influence can be created through site clustering, color coding, 
or delineation of territorial borders that limit public access to an area and encourage the 
creation of community ties among neighbors.
Newman’s recommendations received tremendous support from research agencies and 
the popular press. The recommendations were incorporated into the existing housing- 
policy guidelines for several states (Dingemans, 1978). Federal programs were created 
that combined Newman’s approach with those emphasizing social, management, and law 
enforcement strategies for crime prevention. This combination, the Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design approach (CPTED), was designed to decrease crime and 
fear of crime in residential, commercial, transportation, and school settings (Tien et al., 
1976). Clearly, Newman’s ideas have had great impact on current crime prevention and 
design trends.
Newman’s ideas also fed into existing academic research on the effects of environ­
mental influences on social behavior. For example, reference to Newman’s work can be 
found in literature on the geography of crime (Capone and Nichols, 1976; Duffala, 1976; 
Harries, 1976; Molumby, 1976). His ideas have also influenced more traditional social 
psychological studies, such as studies of the links between territoriality, crime, and fear 
of crime for elderly populations (Patterson, 1978).
Despite such impact several critics have faulted Newman for both methodological and 
conceptual issues. Some have challenged his research methods, including his sample 
selection procedures and dependent measures, as well as his statistical analyses, conclu­
sions, and generalizations (Hillier, 1973; Kaplan, 1973; Mawby, 1977; Patterson, 1977). 
Others (Adams, 1973; Dingemans, 1978; Mawby, 1977) have pointed out that Newman’s 
design recommendations are never integrated into a unified framework. For example, 
minimal attention is given to the number of design factors necessary for defensible space, 
the relative importance of each cluster of design factors, and the effects of combinations 
of design factors.
One can also argue that Newman’s analysis ignores the cognitive and behavioral 
processes underlying defensible space. Newman’s original thesis appeared to presume 
that certain designs automatically elicit territoriality. Most critics favor less deterministic 
conceptions of the relationship between design and territoriality (Brown and Altman, 
1981; Taylor et al., 1980). Subsequent work in the area of defensible space has been 
geared toward more rigorous assessment of the role of design in vulnerability to crime 
and toward exploring links among physical designs, territorial cognitions, and behaviors.
K TERRITORIAL APPROACH TO SUBURBAN BURGLARY
The Territorial M odel '
Brown and Altman (1981) developed a territorial model of residential burglary that was 
applied to a subsequent study of burglaries in a suburban setting. The model stated that 
burglars are especially sensitive to the variations between the following three types of
IAL TERRITORIES 233
territories described by Altman (1975). Public territories, such as bus seats or city 
sidewalks, are least central and enduring; primary territories, such as bedrooms and 
homes, are most central and enduring. In between are secondary territories, such as bars 
and certain neighborhoods, which are intermediate on the dimensions of centrality and 
duration and are often jointly owned by members of a group.
Brown and Altman (1981) further reasoned that there were additional differences among 
public, secondary, and primary territories. In public territories, markers are often utili­
tarian objects (e.g ., sweaters, books) placed with the specific intention of “staking out” 
a territory and regulating access to it. Because owners establish no deep psychological 
investments in the territory they do not react strongly to intrusions. In primary territories, 
on the other hand, owners identify highly with the territory and use decorative markers 
intended as self-expressions. Because of the strong psychological ties to primary terri­
tories, residents react quite strongly to intrusions. Thus primary, secondary, and public 
territories differ in terms of marker type, marking intentions, and reactions to intrusion 
in addition to previously noted differences in duration of occupancy and psychological 
centrality.
The above differences can be used to interpret Newman’s observations of crime in 
public housing projects. Newman found lower crime rates when a secondary territory 
provided a buffer zone between the public street and the primary territory of the apartment 
unit itself. Conversely, higher crime rates were observed when the public territory, one 
where individuals can act without fear of censure by others, extended right to the threshold 
of the apartment.
Given that the conceptual differences among types of territories appeared to converge 
with Newman’s observations of actual crime rates, a sequential model of the burglars’ 
decision-making processes was developed. This model assumed that burglars implicitly 
or explicitly assess the relative degrees of territorial boundary permeability of residential 
streets, house sites, and houses. Naturally, most burglars try to avoid houses that appear 
to be occupied or inaccessible. The territorial model goes beyond these obvious points 
and states that evidence of territorial surveillance and concern are important as well. A 
burglar is expected to prefer a territory that appears to be public and open, compared to 
a territory that appears to be private and closed to strangers. For example, a burglar 
should be more at ease on a street with a public territorial quality than on a street that 
the neighbors treat as a secondary territory. Similarly, burglars will choose homes with 
few primary territory markers over homes with many markers.
Within this model then, the territorial markers hypothesized to deter burglars may not 
provide physical barriers to access. The deterrent value of the markers stems from the 
symbolic communication of residents’ concern for and defense of the territory. The 
physical indications of territoriality, hypothesized to be important in the decision-making 
processes of burglars, are conceptualized as belonging to four classes of territorial in­
dicators, as outlined below.
The Territorial Features
Symbolic Barriers. These barriers are physical qualities that communicate the terri­
torial concern and personal identity of the owners (Newman, 1972). In a residential setting 
the landscaping, hedges, welcome mats, and the color of the house all serve as markings 
or personalizations indicating territoriality. Such markers may communicate the territorial 
concerns of specific families or of entire blocks.
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Actual Barriers. These barriers are aspects of a security system such as locks, alarms, 
and guards that may impede access (Newman, 1972). Clearly, weak or absent real barriers 
are associated with burglary (Reppetto, 1974). .
Traces. Traces are clues that inform the burglar of the probable presence or absence 
of residents or neighbors. The burglar may actually see the owners or infer their presence 
by sensing clues such as lights, cars, television noises, uncollected mail, etc.
Detectability. The detectability factors include various aspects of visual or auditory 
accessibility of a home and of people near or in the home. Examples include the positioning 
of houses or trees and the existence of squeaky gates or barking dogs. Detectability is 
hypothesized to be important in the development and defense of neighborhood territories.
Through a review of the literature, preliminary observations of houses, and discussions 
with burglars, a rating system was devised that included specific examples of actual and 
symbolic barriers, traces, and detectability factors.
A total of 18 clusters were developed to measure the four general classes of territorial 
features. The 18 clusters were used to compare a total of 306 burglarized and nonbur­
glarized houses within one neighborhood in Salt Lake County (hereafter referred to as 
the Salt Lake study). It was expected that burglarized houses would appear to be more 
public and open to intrusion through a combination of weak symbolic and actual barriers, 
few traces, and poor detectability.
A suburban neighborhood was chosen for the Salt Lake study because both Newman 
and Altman emphasized that territorial personalizations may reflect the residents’ territorial 
attitudes. Although Newman’s observations concerned public housing projects, these 
tenants rarely have much control over the outside personalization of their dwelling. 
Suburbanites, on the other hand, typically have very strong financial and psychological 
investments in their homes, which they may display through home decoration, design, 
and upkeep. Thus a suburbanite’s choice of and modifications to the dwelling are likely 
to reflect the personal preferences of the occupants.
Differences Between Burglarized and Nonburglarized Houses
Of the 18 clusters developed (see Brown, 1983 for a complete description) six were found 
to distinguish between burglarized and nonburglarized houses. The following review 
describes these six differences in terms of the fourfold territorial classification of symbolic 
and actual barriers, detectability, and traces. Results of other studies are also treated 
within this framework to provide a broad overview of the variety of ways in which design 
is linked to burglary deterrence. 5 •: ;
Symbolic Barriers
In the Salt Lake study, two classes of symbolic barrier cues distinguished burglarized 
from nonburglarized homes. Nonburglarized homes were more likely to have clear state­
ments of the owner’s identity displayed through name or address signs on the house or 
front lawn. These symbols were hypothesized to show that the residents cared enough 
about their territory to personalize it. Burglars were presumed to detect a high level of 
territorial concern and to assume that residents would be more defensive against intruders. 
In addition, the burglar might infer that residents of personalized dwellings are very
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community spirited. These residents might be more likely to have concerned neighbors 
to look after their property.
The use of a name plate is just one of many ways in which owners may reveal their 
attachments to their primary territory. Other primary territory personalizations that made 
no difference in deterring Salt Lake burglars included the amount of flowers, lawn 
furniture, degree of architectural uniqueness, elevation differences, or surface qualities 
(material, color) of the house. While the underlying concept o f personalization still should 
be a valid method of communicating territorial concern and attachment, it is likely that 
particular methods of achieving unique appearances will vary depending on constraints 
and opportunities provided in the setting.
An opposite argument, that personalizations create vulnerability to burglary, also 
sounds intuitively appealing. Personalizations could serve as clues to the burglar that the 
residents are wealthy and have goods worth stealing. In fact, drawings of houses with 
curtains, flowerboxes, and ornaments have been found to evoke images of “high class” 
more than similar drawings that had the personalizations removed (Taylor et al., 1976). 
But personalized houses were also perceived to be in neighborhoods that were “desirable,” 
“safe at night,” and had “strong community organizations.” Thus, the same symbols that 
may lead burglars to expect a high payoff may also lead them to expect defensive behavior 
on the part of residents. National statistics provide indirect support for the deterrent effect 
of personalizations. Despite the fact that personalizations may be most prevalent in the 
suburbs, burglars do not choose these lucrative targets as often as they choose households 
of the young, the poor, and renters (U.S. Department of Justice, 1983).
Returning to the Salt Lake study, the second component of symbolic barriers that 
distinguished the two house groups involved public street signs. Burglarized houses were 
more likely to have public street signs such as “Yield” or “25 MPH” or “Pedestrian 
Crossing” positioned somewhere on the block. It may be that burglars feel more com­
fortable on blocks with such signs because they are signals directed to the public at large. 
When these signs show that the general public is accommodated on the block, then the 
burglar is likely to feel less conspicuous or intrusive. A possible counterargument is that 
street signs just signify heavy traffic, which is, in turn, related to burglary. A 15-minute 
traffic count in the Salt Lake study did not support this counterargument. Burglarized 
blocks had as much pedestrian and vehicular traffic as nonburglarized blocks. In this 
sample it seemed to be the symbolic indication of openness to public use that made the 
difference, not striking differences in actual public use.
Symbolic barriers do not have to be strictly environmental in form. Social clues may 
also convey to criminals the degree of territorial boundary permeability in an area. For 
example, ethnic diversity in one apartment complex was cited as one reason why residents 
refrained from involvement with their neighbors (Merry, 1981). The different ethnic 
groups remained distant from one another because they found it difficult to interpret and 
understand each others’ behavior and customs. The ethnic differences and aloof behavior 
of residents created a quite permeable symbolic barrier; strangers realized that they could 
enter the area and behave as they pleased.
Brantingham and Brantingham (1975) may have discovered much the same phenom­
enon with a quite different methodology. They used neighborhood census data to draw 
social boundaries between blocks when adjacent blocks differed in terms of housing 
value, rent, ethnicity, and proportions of single-family dwellings. Higher crime rates 
occurred on blocks along these social boundaries than on the interior blocks. Although 
residents were not interviewed, one can speculate that residents in heterogeneous boundary
areas failed to develop group territories with their neighbors because of their social 
dissimilarities.
In other studies, symbolic barriers used to personalize private territorial claims have 
been linked to actual crime rates, fear of crime, and perceptions of territoriality. As 
mentioned previously, individuals perceive personalizations such as flowerboxes, orna­
ments, and outdoor furniture as signs that the neighborhood is quite safe at night (Taylor 
et al., 1976). Conversely, individuals perceive poor maintenance, few trees, and few 
exterior decorations as signs that residents will be concerned with crime (Craik and 
Appleyard, 1980).
Actual links between residents’ personalizations and other indicators of territi riality 
have also been demonstrated. Anecdotal evidence suggests that gardening projects in 
urban high-crime areas increase residents’ behavioral involvement with the neighbo hood, 
their sense of neighborhood cohesion, and general neighborhood upkeep, as w ell as 
decreasing vandalism in the area (Lewis, 1979). In another study, backyard gart: ;ners 
were found to perceive lower levels of territorial problems (e.g., vandalism, littcing) 
and to judge it easier to distinguish neighbors from strangers (Taylor et al., 1981). Fe ices, 
hedges, and “no trespassing” signs on houses have been linked to faster responses to a 
doorbell, an indication of quicker territorial defense (Edney, 1972). Finally, a ran; e of 
symbolic demarcations, including personal identity markers, were associated with resident 
perceptions of territorial security (Patterson, 1978).
Note that while Newman considered signs of private access and use to be symbolic 
“barriers,” this term was developed with reference to an intruder’s perception of these 
symbols. What may serve as barriers to individuals intent on wrongdoing may simulta­
neously be symbols of community pride and cohesion to fellow neighbors (cf. Lewis and 
Maxfield, 1980 concerning physical and social civilities and incivilities).
A ctual B arriers
Nonburglarized houses in the Salt Lake study were more likely to have boundary barriers 
to access such as fences or hedges. Surprisingly, this finding was a novel one (cf. Booth, 
1981; U.S. Department of Justice, 1980). Upon reflection, it is possible that fences provide 
more symbolic than actual protection from intruders. In the suburban environment few 
fences are high enough and few gate latches strong enough to halt a determined intruder. 
In fact, in the Salt Lake study, houses were credited with these actual barriers even when 
the fences just ran along one property boundary but failed to enclose the property. The 
true deterrent value of fences may be that they reduce ambiguity associated with territorial 
intrusion. It is clear both to the burglar and to the neighbors that strangers who cross the 
border of the fence without legitimate reason are intruders.
The more common focus on actual barriers, although not examined in the Salt Lake 
study, has been on security hardware for doors and windows as well as alarm systems. 
While devices such as dead bolt locks are useful deterrents to burglars (Rubenstein et 
al., 1980; Waller and Okihiro, 1978), residents often fail to use their security hardware, 
properly (U.S. Department of Justice, 1979). In fact, in 1975, 44% of the residential 
burglaries required no technical sophistication on behalf of the burglar; the burglar simply 
entered through an unlocked door or window (U.S. Department of Justice, 1979). Burglars 
who are faced with a locked entryway can often break in without having to rely on 
sophisticated skills because simple maneuvers such as kicking, prying, or smashing often 
prove successful. Consequently, and contrary to popular belief, technical requirements
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of entry rarely prove to be of utmost concern to burglars (Letkemann, 1973; Maguire 
and Bennett, 1982; Reppetto, 1974).
Detectability
Detectability factors describe the visual and auditory accessibility of a dwelling and of 
people near or in the dwelling. The optimal burglary target is one where the burglar can 
determine, through visual inspection, the probability of the residents being home and the 
options available for access and escape routes. Simultaneously, the burglar wants to avoid 
detection by concerned neighbors and passers-by.
In the Salt Lake study, burglars avoided designs that allowed for adjacent house 
visibility. This particular index of detectability was taken from a vantage point in front 
of the house. When glancing to the right, left, and across the street, more neighboring 
houses on the block were visible from a nonburglarized house than from a burglarized 
one. The burglarized houses suffered poor detectability for reasons such as a comer lot 
position within the block or visibility screens due to trees, winding roads, or hilly terrain. 
Whatever the cause, burglars may have felt more secluded from view when approaching 
a burglarized house. These findings were consistent with the finding that burglaries occur 
where there are opportunities for concealment near doors and windows. (Rubenstein et 
al., 1980).
A view of neighbors’ houses may also protect from burglary indirectly by encouraging 
neighborhood territoriality. Previous research has shown that neighbors often become 
acquainted when they see each other in the course of daily chores— gardening, collecting 
mail, or just walking to and fro (Beck and Teasdale, 1978; Festinger et al., 1950). In 
neighborhoods where the design encourages such informal contacts the neighbors are 
more likely to develop a sense of group territory and to become protective of each other’s 
territory. Thus enhanced detectability may not only make an intruder’s actions visible, 
it may also encourage a degree of familiarity and concern among neighbors that motivates 
them to challenge an intruder’s presence.
Many crime-prevention guidelines fail to recognize that surveillance opportunities must 
be combined with a sense of responsibility on the part of onlookers in order to provide 
protection against crime. Much of this neglect can be traced to concepts of city planning 
popularized by Jane Jacobs, a prominent supporter of the concept of mixed residential 
and commercial land usage. She believed that the steady flow of traffic generated in such 
areas would provide many “eyes on the street,” which would ensure a level of safety.
Newman (1972) disagreed with Jacobs and asserted that the mere presence of onlookers 
would not confer defensible space to an area. He stated that “commercial and institutional 
generators of activity do not, in and of themselves, necessarily enhance the safety of 
adjoining streets and areas” (p. 112). “The success or failure of a particular configuration 
depends as much on the degree to which residents can identify with and survey activity 
in the related facility as it does on the nature of the users of that facility and the activities 
they engage in” (Newman, p. 114). Nonetheless, such social considerations are often 
neglected in tests of defensible space. In a recent example, the defensible space hypothesis 
was deemed to be supported if “low crime is associated with mixed residential and 
nonresidential use” (Greenberg and Rohe, 1984, p. 50). It is clear that future tests of the 
defensible-space concept must take into account the quality as well as quantity of onlookers 
provided within an environmental setting.
The “eyes on the street” notion suffers from a lack of empirical as well as conceptual
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support. Latane and Darley (1970) demonstrated convincingly that increasing the number 
of onlookers actually decreases the likelihood that any one individual will intervene in 
a witnessed emergency. Thus criminals in highly trafficked areas may realize that on­
lookers either do not recognize an ongoing crime or do not feel personally resp onsible 
for taking action. For example, vandals will readily strip a car in broad dayligl when 
the onlookers have no apparent investment in protecting the car (Zimbardo, 1973). Sim ­
ilarly, a high volume of traffic has been found to be associated with street crime ( Angel 
1968). ’
Certain environmental conditions discourage residents from translating the potential 
for territorial surveillance into instances of territorial defense. High volumes of traffic on 
residential blocks appear to discourage residents from exerting territorial control (Apple- 
yard, 1981; Appleyard and Lintell, 1972). Residents of highly trafficked streets have been 
shown to know fewer of their neighbors and to spend less time in front of their house. 
These residents do not extend their perceived zones of territorial ownership beyond the 
boundaries of the house itself. They may, in fact, orient the bulk of their activities toward 
the quieter back regions of the house. The only eyes on the street may be those of other 
passersby who have no vested interest in the protection of the territory. Thus a heavy 
traffic flow may create a vulnerability to crime by turning a neighborhood street into a 
public territory; a light traffic flow may protect from crime by creating a private zone 
and enhancing the development of a shared secondary territory among neighbors.
Other environmental conditions encourage the translation of detectability potentials 
into responsibility for defense. In multiunit residential settings Newman recommended 
that this goal be accomplished by clustering a small number of units around semiprivate 
entryways and positioning windows to allow informal surveillance of these semipri’ ate 
buffer zones. In addition to creating the physical possibility that neighbors can look ai'ter 
one another’s property, these designs are also thought to encourage a number of social 
expressions of territoriality. By limiting the number of outsiders and reducing the number 
of residents, neighbors may come to recognize each other and be able to distinguish 
fellow residents from outside intruders. The common entry way space, small numbei of 
residents, and informal surveillance opportunities are expected to enhance feelings of 
group identity and common defense of group space.
These expectations were tested in a design intervention conducted in neighborhoods 
in Hartford, Connecticut (Fowler et al., 1979). Of eleven streets involved in the inter­
vention, some were converted to one-way streets or cul-de-sacs while others were blocked 
off or had their entrances narrowed. The immediate results of these changes included a 
decrease in the burglary rate, a decrease in the traffic rate, an increase in pedestrian use 
by residents, and modest improvements in the residents’ neighborliness. Specifically, 
informal house-watching arrangements between neighbors increased as did their reported 
ability to distinguish strangers from other residents on the street. Despite these results, 
residents were not more likely to feel that the neighborhood was a better place to live, 
to feel more a part of the neighborhood, to perceive their neighbors as helpful people, 
or to decrease their fear of burglary. Similarly, residents were no more likely to intervene 
in suspicious situations or to feel that their neighbors would do so. Therefore, a territorially 
restricted appearance may protect against burglary despite the absence of strong territorial 
attitudes among residents.
A second evaluation, conducted two years later, unexpectedly showed that the feelings 
of territorial control and cohesion had increased. Residents felt that the neighborhood
j
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was a better place to live, that they were more a part of the neighborhood, and that their 
neighbors were helpful people who would intervene in a suspicious situation. Additionally, 
actual reports of residents intervening in suspicious situations increased. Residents re­
ported lower fear of burglary and robbery despite the fact that the actual burglary rate, 
which had decreased after implementation o f the program, had risen back up to the 
expected levels. Future research is needed to clarify the reasons for differences between 
short- and long-range effects on street redesign.
In a suburban setting, cul-de-sac designs appear to provide detectability opportunities 
and to facilitate the development of secondary territorial ties among neighbors. Residents 
of houses on cul-de-sacs have reported greater identification, greater sense of security, 
and a stronger sense of community on the block than residents of through streets (Brown, 
1983). Cul-de-sac residents also reported more social contacts with a larger proportion 
of their block neighbors than did residents o f through streets. These results held even 
after controlling for the smaller size of the cul-de-sac blocks (Brown, 1983). Perhaps 
because of the restricted accessibility and enhanced territoriality, cul-de-sacs have lower 
burglary rates than through streets (Bevis and Nutter, 1973; Brown, 1983).
A study of robbers of residences confirms that they consider detectability features in 
conjunction with social features of territoriality (Merry, 1981). Robbers divided residents 
into types: those who would do nothing, those who would intervene directly (usually by 
verbal confrontation), and those who would call authorities. Although robbers generally 
preferred to work in low-visibility areas, they would work in view of the first type of 
resident but would avoid working within the surveillance zone of the third. Burglars, 
interviewed in a separate study, showed agreement with the robbers concerning deterrents 
to crime. Although only 5% of burglars said that strong locks would deter them, 23% 
admitted they would be deterred by “neighbors checking.” The older, more experienced 
burglars seemed even more wary, with 35% of them reporting deterrence by neighbors 
(Reppetto, 1974).
Empirical tests of the efficacy of visual surveillance that neglect to take into account 
the neighbors’ sense of territorial responsibility yield contradictory results, as expected. 
For example, in a study of university staff housing, dwellings positioned midblock ex­
perienced fewer burglaries than dwellings on the end of the row, where detectability by 
neighbors was limited (Odekunle, 1979). However, a study of more socially diverse 
neighborhoods revealed no differences between midblock and corner burglaries (Waller 
and Okihiro, 1978). Similarly, a recent review of 15 street-lighting projects, which ignored 
the territorial attitudes of the users, revealed no association between crime and street 
lighting (U.S. Department of Justice, 1980). Therefore, future research should consider 
that territorially protective attitudes are needed to capitalize on the design potentials for 
territorial defense.
Traces '
Traces describe the actual or implied presence of residents. Current crime prevention 
programs emphasize the importance of disguising extended absences from home by having 
neighbors collect the mail and newspapers, mow lawns, etc. In the Salt Lake study, 
although the houses showed few definite signs of absence, the burglarized houses had 
fewer definite traces of presence. These traces included such signs of occupancy as 
sprinklers operating, parked cars, and tools in the yard. No data were available to de-
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termine whether burglarized residents actually spent fewer hours at home. In an, case 
the appearance of occupancy was linked to protection from intrusion.
Another type of trace that distinguished the two groups of houses was the presence 
of a garage. Nonburglarized houses were more likely to have garages attached to them. 
It is possible that garages provide a protective shield to mask the absence of the resident. 
When the resident typically parks the car in the driveway or on the street, that resident’s 
absence is quite noticeable when the car is gone. However, when the car is typically 
parked in a garage and the garage doors closed, the burglar cannot use the car as a .ignal 
of presence or absence.
Surprisingly little research has focused on traces as deterrents to burglary. While most 
burglary-prevention programs encourage residents to have neighbors disguise si; :s of 
absence and to use timers and lights to create traces of presence, few studies have exan>ined 
their actual deterrent value (Lavrakas, 1981).
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Because of the proliferation of potential burglary targets, burglars can afford to be choosy. 
Research reviewed in the present paper suggests that subtle signs of territorial occupancy, 
detectability, accessibility, and concern can deter burglars. Results of an intensive study 
of a Salt Lake County neighborhood revealed six specific differences between burglarized 
and nonburglarized houses, as illustrated in Figures 1 and 2. Nonburglarized houses 
appeared to be strong primary territories because of the presence of symbolic identity 
markers and actual barriers, which communicated privacy and individuality. Nonbur­
glarized houses had detectability features that provided clear views of adjacent neighboring 
houses. Finally, the traces of presence and garages indicated greater use or implied use 
by the residents of nonburglarized houses. By contrast, the burglarized properties appeared 
more public and open to intrusion (tested via stepwise multiple regression; this yielded 
multiple R =  0.14, F(6,197) =  5.19, p <  0.01). As the review of other research in­
dicates, these six features represent just a sampling of the range of territorial features 
that have been associated with burglary deterrence.
FIGURE 1. A nonburglarized house on a nonburglarized block. (Reprinted with permission from 
Environmental Psychology, by Fisher, Bell, and Baum, p. 188.)
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FIGURE 2. A burglarized house. (Reprinted with permission from Environmental Psychology, by 
Fisher, Bell, and Baum, p. 188.)
Several areas of uncertainty concerning the role of territoriality in crime prevention 
remain. In particular, it is not clear whether or when territorial claims need only be 
apparent to be effective. For example, it is not clear whether the mere appearance of 
individualized and unique territories, achieved through color coding, identity markers, 
or restricted access, will deter criminals in the absence of territorial attitudes and behaviors 
on the part of residents. Burglars may prefer to avoid the risk of “testing” residents whose 
dwellings appear strongly territorial to see if the appearances are reinforced by territorial 
behavior. Future research and theory needs to address the separate and combined influences 
of social and physical components of territoriality on criminals’ selections of targets.
Similarly, relationships among the four classes of territorial features outlined in the 
present paper have not been examined. In combination, these features may amplify or 
cancel out the effectiveness of each other. For example, the deterrent impacts of symbolic 
barriers and detectability factors may be multiplicative, not additive, when both are 
present. Similarly, a fence acting as an actual barrier may have its deterrent impact 
reversed if the fence is high enough to block visibility.
Relationships among secondary and primary territiorial features are also vague. Res­
idents who choose to create highly individualized primary territorial appearances may 
prefer to avoid, or may be rejected from, the chance to develop a secondary block territory 
with the neighbors. The relationship between primary and secondary territories may reflect 
universal tensions existing between individuals and groups.
Finally, this paper has focused exclusively on the goal of crime deterrence in design. 
Residents and designers must take into account all of the consequences of design elements. 
For example, cul-de-sac designs may reduce the crime rate and increase the strength of 
the secondary block territory but may confuse motorists and impede emergency vehicle 
access. Or, designs that allow for informal surveillance of neighbors’ houses may also 
thwart the residents’ desires for privacy. Of course, not all of these unforeseen effects 
of designs will be unpleasant. For example, residents of cul-de-sacs have been found to 
enjoy greater pride in their home appearance and a greater sense of security and community 
on the block than residents of through streets (Brown, 1983). Residents and designers 
must judge how to fit potentially crime-deterrent design guidelines into the total package 
of design goals.
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